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CHAPTER I 
LITERATURE.REVIEW 
Introduction 
During the 1950's, workers in the area of group decision-making 
contended that group decisions tend to be more conservative than the 
decisions made by individuals acting alone. The main factor identified 
behind the conservativeness of group decisions was ~ocial pressures, 
brought upon deviates during group discussion, to conform to the 
desires of the majority. Whyte (1956), a noted critic of the bureau-
cratic system, felt that social pressures aimed at nonconforming mem-
bers served to inhibit the boldness of the creative individual, 
reducing him to the common level of the group, and leading to decisions 
which were noncreative and cautious. Whyte's contention had been well 
supported by research in the area of conformity. For example, Schac-
ter (1951) found that when groups were forced to reach consensus, then 
influence attempts were directed toward deviates to yield to the major-
ity9 s decision. The influence attempts tended to reduce variability 
among members and gave rise to an averaging effect, which caused a 
decrement in group risk taking. 
However, Stoner (1961) ·found that group consensus on hypothetical 
life dilemma problems tended to be more risky than the decisions of 
individual members, acting alone prior to group discussion. Stoner's 
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contradictory findings served as a strong research impetus for others, 
and sance his original work a voluminous amount of research has attemp-
ted to identify the factors that underlie the shift phenomenon. Unfor-
tunately, research into the choice shift phenomenon has become remote 
from the initial purpose of the area, which was to identify the fac.tors 
that were influential in the decisions generated by important, higher-
order policy making groups. · Instead, research has treated the choice 
shift as an isolated laboratory phenomenon, with little concern as to 
how the choice shift relates to the real world. The same criticism may 
be given for the theories that have been developed from choice shift 
research. For the empirical results to be useful beyond explaining an 
artificial laboratory situation, then it will be necessary to tie the 
findings to a broad theoretical framework. 
As several writers have noted (Cartwright, 1971; Jones & Gerard, 
1967; Wallach, Kogan & Bern, 1964), the study of group dynamics would 
seem a useful framework within which to examine the choice shift find-
ings. Yet, group properties have been almost totally ignored by 
research in the area. The present chapter reviews the choice shift 
literature in relation to group properties and their effects on the 
resulting shift. The review begins by briefly discussing the instru-
ments and research paradigm that have traditionally been employed to 
investigate shifts in group preferences. The presentation provides a 
comparison base in which theories of the choice shift are discussed. 
The review is also concerned with how group properties have been used 
in the research, and how small group research on group prpperties 
could be used to increase the predictability of shifts in risk 
preference. 
3 
Instruments 
The most common instrument for measuring shift is Kogan and 
Wallach's (1964) Choice Dilemma Questionnaire (CDQ), which consists of 
twelve hypothetical "life dilemma" situations. Each story presents a 
dilemma, plus the favorable and unfavorable potential outcomes of the 
situation. The subject's task is to choose an alternative with the 
lowest probability for success he would consider acceptable to advise 
the protagonist of the story to take a particular action. The odds 
for a successful outcome decrease from 9-in-10 to l-in-10, with one 
alternative available for those who would not advise taking a ris~ 
regardless of the odds. 
The popularity of the CDQ is partly due to its consistency in 
producing shift. Ten of the items give shifts toward risk, while two 
items produce shifts toward caution (Cartwright, 1971). A major 
advantage of such frequent use of the same instrument is that one can 
make comparisons across studies. However, an offsetting potential 
disadvantage has been found by Clark and Williams (1969). Using the 
CDQ items and two different sets of instructions, the traditional set 
and a neutral set, they found a shift only with the traditional set. 
No shift occurred in the neutral instruction condition. 
Clark and Williams suggest that the reliability of the shift 
found when CDQ items are used may be due to the demand characteristics 
built into the instructions. They postulate that the demand character-
istics consist of two components: 1) the subjective directional 
expectations generated by the instructions, and 2) the social process 
in the group discussion which allows each subject to conform to his 
directional expectations. 
The problem facing the investigator is the lack of a reliable 
alterQative task. The .most popular alternative has been gambling 
situations, but the results from such tasks are mixed, sometimes pro-
ducing shifts, frequently showing no shift (Dion, Baron, & Miller, 
1970). Another limitation is the simplicity of many gambling situa-
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. tions. For example, Blasovich, Veach, and Ginsburg (1973) used a 
realistic casino blackjack game to measure shifts in betting preference. 
The group situation consisted of each player stating his betting pre-
ference without discussion. 'lhe simplicity of the task used by Blas-
ovich does not allow one to study the processes occurring during a 
group discussion, and such discussion processes must be understood if 
social psychology is to understand the mechanisms that influence group 
decision-making. 
It appears that research will continue to employ the CDQ until a 
reliable alternative instrument is developed. Work by Higbee (1971), 
who has created a complex, military decision game, suggests that 
alternatives may soon be available. 
Traditional Research Paradigm 
The majority of the studies in the choice shift employ some type 
of a repeated measures design (Dion et al., 1970). Subjects are pre-
tested individually, then placed into a group, where they are instructed 
to discuss each item until consensus is reached as to which alternative 
is most acceptable. Shift is measured by comparing the mean pretest 
score of the individuals who comprise the group against the mean of the 
group score. An additional posttest measure is sometimes employed by 
having subjects respond individually after the group situation 
(e.g., Bern, Wallach & Kogan, 1965; Marquis, 1962). Subjects have been 
found to adhere to the group decision for as long as six weeks after 
group discussion. 
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Cartwright (1971) has criticized the rigid adherence to the 
repeated measure design. He points out that shift "refers to shifts in 
choices and not differences between the choices of individuals and 
groups who are considering the items for the first time" (p. 373). 
That is~ groups cannot be said to be more risky than individuals until 
it has been shown that the initial choice of groups is more risky than 
the initial choices of individuals. 
Two studies have employed a between-subject design (Carlson & 
Davis, 1971; McCauley, Kogan & Teger, 1971). Both failed to find a 
significant shift, although the shift sizes were roughly equivalent to 
the sizes found when a repeated measure design has been used. The 
authors of the two articles blamed the decreased sensitivity of between-
subject designs for the lack of a significant effect. 
Recently, Gaskell, Thomas and Farr (1973), using a modified 
Solomon's four group design, have found groups to be more risky. They 
obtained the following results: 1) Pretesting, in anticipation of 
group discussion, reduced the extremity of pretest scores but did not 
alter the· mean, and 2) subjects who engaged in group discussion, b~t 
had not been pretested, were more risky than the pretest scores of 
individuals. These results suggest that groups are more risky. 
Group Dynamics in the Choice Shift 
To date, research on the choice shift has almost completely ignored 
the potential effects various group properties may have on the shift. 
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If results are to be generalized to the real world, it would seem im-
portant to consider group properties in relation to choice shifts. The 
present section will review investigations that have considered two 
essential properties of groups, leadership and cohesiveness. 
Leadership Theories 
Since natural groups have not been employed, the rrain use of lead-
ership has been to postulate the effects which initially extreme risk 
takers have on the group decision. Leadership theories share the basic 
tenet that high initial risk takers are more influential in the group 
discussion, thereby inducing others to shift toward more risky alter-
natives (Marquis, 1962). A similar explanation is offered for items 
that give shifts toward caution. The individuals who select extremely 
cautious choices tend to be more persuasive and produce a shift to 
caution. 
The main support for the leadership postulate is from studies 
where group members were asked to list the most influential member 
during discussion. On risk items, the initial high risk taker is con~ 
sistently seen as the most influential (Wallach, Kogan & Bern, 1962; 
Wallach, Kogan & Burt, 1965), while for cautious items, those initially 
choosing cautious alternatives are selected as being most influential 
(Rabow, Fowler, Bradford, Hofeller & Shibuya, 1966). Although such 
evidence gives strong support to the various leadership theories, a 
counter= explanation still remains; that is, s·ubjects view the initial 
extreme member as most influential because they have shifted toward 
his position, rather than because he actually exercised the most influ-
ence during the discussion (Hoyt & Stoner, 1968). 
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To date, four versions of leadership theory have been advanced as 
explanations for the risk phenomenon. These are personality hypotheses, 
iirhetoric=of-risk11 and "persuasive-arguments" hypotheses, leadership-
confidence theory, and release theory. The first maintains that indi-
viduals who are high risk takers are inherently more persuasive, and 
naturally evolve into a leadership role. This version has received 
virtually no support, as a large number of studies have shown that 
leadership is not a strong personality trait, but is situationally 
tletermined (Gibbs, 1969). 
A second version asserts that the structure of language makes 
arguments favoring risk more persuasive than those favoring caution 
(Pruitt, 1971). Direct support for this version; known as the "rhetoric= 
of=risk01 hypothesis, is lacking; however, indirect support is available, 
Earlier, it was mentioned that gambling situations have produced mixed 
results. Kelley and Thibaut (1969) have suggested that a central cause 
for lack of shift in several of the situations is due to the void of 
rhetoric in discussing the bets, When Pruitt and Teger (1969) created 
a gambling task which allowed rich discussion, a sizable shift occurred. 
Vinokurvs persuasive=arguments theory relies heavily on the 
rhetoric=of-risk hypothesis. His theory states that each item generates 
a pool of persuasive arguments supporting each of the alternatives for 
that item. A subject's initial choice is determined by the pool of 
arguments he has available. In the group situation, the shift occurs 
because a greater variety of arguments are presented by other members, 
increasing the likelihood that a different alternative will be found 
to be attractive, Vinokur and his associates have provided a consider= 
able amount of support for this theory (Burnstein & Vinokur, 1973; 
Burnstein, Vinokur & Trope, 1973; Vinokur & Burnstein, 1974). 
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The persuasive-arguments theory can be construed as an alternative 
to the rhetoric-of-risk hypothesis. If one adopts the position that the 
initial extreme risk takers possess a more complete pool of arguments 
favoring their choice, then these individuals should be able to exer-
cise influence during the group situation through the presentation of 
new arguments for consideration. An indirect test of this position was 
provided by Ellis, Spencer, and Oldfield-Box (1969). In their experi-
mental groups, subjects were carefully matched for initial extremity on 
specific items, while the control groups were composed of randomly 
chosen members. As expected, a significant shift occurred in the con-
trol groups, but not in the experimental groups. Since each member of 
the experimental groups should have based his initial choice on a sim= 
ilar but limited set of arguments, persuasive-arguments theory would 
have predicted no shift for these groups. 
Several studies have produced evidence against the persuasive-
arguments theory. First, studies have been reported where shifts 
occurred in an information only condition; that is, members merely 
revealed their choices without discussing the items (Pruitt & Teger, 
1969; Stokes, 1971; Teger & Pruitt, 1967). Secondly, Graham and Harris 
(1969) found that when groups discussed half the items, but not the 
other half, a full shift occurred to both sets of items. Without 
discussion, it would be impossible for high risk takers to expose other 
members to their unique arguments. Obviously, other mechanisms beside 
persuasive-arguments affect the group shift. 
A third version of leadership theory was developed by Burnstein 
(1969), who asserts that initial high risk takers are more confident 
of their selections, and their confidence gives them greater assertive-
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ness and influence during the group discussion. For cautious s~ifts, 
the explanation is simply reversed, so that individuals choosing low 
risk alternatives are accredited with greater confidence and influence. 
The strongest support for the leadership-confidence theory comes 
from Burnstein (1969) and Calusen (1965), both using gambling situa-
tions, Clausen found no significant shift in groups whose high risk 
taker was low in confidence, but a risky shift did occur in groups with 
a high confidence, high risk taker. Burnstein likewise found a positive 
correlation between initial risk taking and confidence. Furthermore, 
Castore, Peterson and Goodrich (1971) obtained a radical shift toward 
risk in groups with a high confidence, individual high risk taker. 
This theory certainly appears to deserve more investigation. 
The final leadership theory was devised by Pruitt (1969) and more 
completely stated by Pruitt (1971). This theory, called release theory, 
is conceptually similar to the phenomenon known as "social contagion" 
(Wheeler, 1970). In social contagion, a person who has strong motiva-
tion to behave in a certain manner, yet feels constrained by social 
norms, is released from the constraining forces when he observes one 
other individual behaving in the desired manner. The observed individ-
ual serves as a model and is imitated. 
Release theory postulates a similar sequence of events to be 
occurring in a choice shift paradigm. In the individual condition, 
subjects are seen as being in a state of conflict, attracted to the 
extremes, yet wanting to conform to a perceived social norm of moder-
ation. The resulting initial choice is a compromise between the 
moderation norm and the attraction toward the extremes. 
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In the group situation, if there is a single member who did not 
compromise his initial choice, but instead chose an extreme, then he 
will serve as a model for the other members. The observed model will 
release the others from the constraining forces and a shift toward the 
extremes will occur. It can be seen that release theory is stated so 
as to include shifts toward risk and caution. 
That the initial choice is made under a state of conflict is sup-
ported by research on the ''Walter Mitty" effect (Pruitt, 1969). Walter 
Mitty was Thurber's fictitious character, who in fantasy saw himself 
as brave and courageous, but in real life was meek and passive. Pruitt 
(1969) found this "syndrome" when lone subjects were faced with the 
CDQ items. He had the following two conditions: 1) subjects rated 
the riskiness of each option, then made their selections, or 2) subjects 
made their selections, then rated the riskiness of each option. 
Results showed that subjects in the first condition made choices they 
had previously rated as cautious, while 8ubjects in condition two rated 
• 
their selections as risky. The actual choice of the two conditions did 
not differ significantly. Higbee (1971) received similar results using 
actual behavior in a complex game as a criterion. 
Unlike the other three versions of leadership theory, release 
theory does not associate the influence process with the high risk 
person's behavior during group discussion. Instead, the influence 
process is attributed to his mere presence in the group. However, 
release theory is supported by the studies mentioned earlier which 
reported the high risk taker as being seen as most influential, if 
this high risk taker is seen to be the model for release of others' 
inhibitions. Furthermore, Hoyt and Stoner's (1968) alternative expla-
nation for these results, that the high risk person is seen as most 
influential because the others shifted toward him, can also be. accom-
modated by release theory. 
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It should be noted that release theory cannot fully explain the 
partial shfits reported by studies which employed an information 
exchange only condition. In fact Dion, Baron, and Miller (1970) have 
suggested that the partial shifts are evidence against all leadership 
theories. ·Release theory is unique since it would predict a shift to 
occur, although it cannot explain why a full shift was not achieved. 
Persuasive=arguments theory is pressed to explain why any shift was 
found, since the members were not able to present new information to 
support the various alternatives. And, since Stokes (1971) found a 
partial shift when members could not see each other, so that non-verbal 
communication was eliminated, leadership-confidence theory would also 
be strained to explain why a shift occurred. 
The phenomenon of partial shifts may imply a two-stage process, 
a combination of release theory and persuasive=arguments theory. The 
release mechanism may work to accentuate the arguments.of the extreme 
risk member~ in that this member·represents a choice that was attractive 
to the others before they compromised to a posi.tion favoring the 
moderation value. The extreme risk individual us choice will be fully 
adbpted by the other members if new information is presented so that the 
po1~l of arguments supporting the alternative is increased. Note that 
it does not have to be the extreme risk member who presents the argu~ 
ments, rather it is left open to any member of the group. 
Silverthorne (1971) found that on items in which a risky s.hift 
occurred the ratio of arguments favoring risk to caution was 12.S to 1. 
On caution producing items, the proportion was 6 to 1 in support of 
cautious alternatives. These observations support the persuasive-
arguments theory. Similar results have been reported by Myers and 
Bishop (1971). Supporting the two-stage process argument, Myers and 
Bishop also found a positive correlation (r = .37) between the propor-
tion of arguments favoring the preferred direction and the size of the 
resulting shift. 
Leadership as a Status Position 
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It will be noted that the various versions of leadership theory do 
not involve a status position within a group, but rather describe a 
particular attribute or situation that allows an individual to influence 
other members. There is evidence that a social influence process does 
occur during group discussion. Gordon, Flanders, and Cranny (1973) 
employed observers, trained to use a behavioral coding instrument, to 
investigate the influence processes occurring during greup discussion. 
The experimental groups were composed of two members wit'h identical 
scores (the coalition), and one member who was either more or less 
risky than the coalition (the deviate). 
During th~ first half of the group discussion, the coalition 
directed their arguments toward the deviate, and these arguments uni-
formly supported the coalitiQn 1 s position. The deviate countered with 
supporting arguments for his position. However, during the latter 
part of the discussion, the deviates changed their arguments so that 
they would conform to the coalition 1 s position, resulting in· a group 
consensus which resembled the coalition 1 s initial choice. Apparently, 
an influence process occurs during group discussion; and, as also 
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occurred in Schacter's (1951) study, the influence attempts are directed 
at the deviate, who eventually conforms to the group 1 s desires. 
The Gordon, et al., (1973) findings suggest that groups possessing 
a status structure, in which influence attempts would be supported by 
sociai power within the group, would be able to assert: strong influence 
over opinion deviates to conform. Research performed using small groups 
have found that status structure provides a means to bring pressure on 
members to conform (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood & Sherif, 1961; 
Sherif,& Sherif, 1964). Ye:t, as Cartwright (1971) noted, status struc-
ture has not been examined within the framework of the choice shift. 
Instead, research which· used status as an independent variable has done 
so by employing members who bring into the laboratory a status position 
that is in relation to a formal organization, rather than in·relation 
to the group in which they particip~te. 
For example, MacKenzie (1970) used as group members businessmen 
who were attending a company sponsored leadership workshop. Each 
subject possessed a certain status position within the.formal structure 
of the company, but when placed into a group of strangers to make 
decisions, each member was of equal status. The results revealed no 
effect for status. Similar results were reported by Siegal and Zajonc 
(1967), who used as group members professionals from a psychiatric 
clinic. Although the results from both studies argue against status 
being a determinant of the choice shift, it is not possible to draw a 
conclusion until groups are used which possess a status within the 
group. 
Another means of assessing the effects of status has been to 
designate one member as group leader, giving him authority for·conduct 
14 
of the group dis:cussion and sole responsibility for the group decisd.on 
(Marquis, 1962). One would expect a decrease in risk taking due to the 
responsibility placed upon the leader~ Significant shifts were found 
in spite of the increased responsibility on an individual member. 
However, Marquis' study is subject to the same cirticism given,above 
to MacKenzie's and Siegal and Zajonc's studies. 
Even though research has ignored status as a potential determinant 
of shift, theorists have not. Janis (1972) has noted that status may 
have a pervasive.influence· on decision-making within higher-order 
groups, particularly when discussion of a problem stalls without a 
consensus being reached. Wallach et al. (1964) suggested that status 
inequities should lead to a decrement in risk taking, since decision 
responsibility would fall on the high status members. That is, 
responsibility would not be placed evenly throughout the group, but 
instead would fall on the high status member's shoulders. Due to the 
resulting blame for decisien failures, high status members may be·un-
willing to accept a risky alternative. And, if the high status member 
. is able to successfully. influence other members, then.one would not 
expect groups with an established status structure to shift toward 
risk. 
A leader's ability to influence the group's decision is dependent 
upon several interrelated factors. One such·factoris familiarity 
with the problem. Sherif and Sherif (1969) point out that a leader's 
influence is increased when· the group is facing a new·problem for 
which guidelines do not exist. A group facing the CDQ items, then, 
should be heavily. influenced by their leader, as the items would pro-
vide a unique problem for the group. ·His influence ability would 
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depend on other properties of his group as well, such· as the degree·of 
cohesiveness, solidarity and the normative structure in·relation to~the 
role system. 
Group Cohesiveness at).d the ChoiceShift 
Group cohesiveness is a multidimensional property that has come 
to hold a place of central importance·to workers.in the area of group 
dynamics. In general, cohesiveness is defined as the degree to which 
·group members are motivated to remain in the group (Cartwright & Zander, 
1968). The identified components of cohesiveness include interpersonal 
attraction among members (Bovard, 1951), attraction toward the group as 
a whole (Jackson, 1959), identification with the group (Indik, 1965) 
and members' expressed desire to remain in the group (Libo, 1953). 
Cohesiveness has been of interest to workers in the choice shift. 
Kogan and Wallach vs diffusion of responsibility theory depended heavily 
. on the effects members 1 interpersonal attraction had on shifts. 
Briefly, diffusion theory postulates that for a shift to occur, felt 
repsonsibility for the decisional outcome has to be diffused among 
group members (Wallach, Kogan & Bern, 1962). The diffusion process was 
thought to be·aided by attraction among members, a process which was 
labeled the affective bonds hypothesis. 
In light of the experimental evidence, the original formulation of 
the affective bonds hypothesis is no longer considered tenable (Pruitt, 
1971); however, cohesiveness has been shown to affect the shift. Dion, 
Miller1 and Magnan. (1971). found that high levels of cohesiveness sup-
pressed the shift toward risk, while.low cohe$iveness produced the 
typical shift. These investigators attributed the suppressed shift 
for high cohesiveness as being caused by members' unwillingness to 
diffuse responsibility ·onto other group member.s. 
Janis (1972), in a thorough study of four important national 
decisions, identified cohesiveness as a major saurce of faulty deci-
sions. He noted that while high levels of cohesiveness reduced the 
amount of selfmcensorship members placed on their opinions due to fear 
of being rebuked by other members, self ... censorship still occurred. 
Members of high cohesive groups seemed to unwittingly censor their 
thoughts and opinions due to a strong·motivation to preserve the unity 
of the group. Janis felt that such· concurrency tendencies .contributed 
to unquestioned acceptance of group decisions, and greatly reduced the 
critical consideration of all potential alternatives and their 
accompanying outcomes. 
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Beyond uncritical acceptance-of group decisions, cohesiveness also 
seems to increase adherence to group standards (Festinger, Schacter & 
Back, 1950). Furthermore, thepower·of a groupto exert influence-over 
its members has been hypothesized to be determined by the degree of 
cohesiveness possessed by the group (Cartwright & Zander, 1968). And 
research by Berkowitz.(1954) suggests that high cohesiveness enhances 
the directional tendencies of the. group, .so that in decision~making 
one would expect the·effects·of high cohesiveness to vary depending 
upon .the no.rm developed during group discussions. Extending this line 
of thought, one would expect high cohesive groups to adhere to the 
group decision more-closely in the posttest condition than·.low cohesive 
groups, particularly if the resulting decision represents an emergent 
group norm. 
17 
Norms are defined as expected modes of behavior and beliefs that 
are·established by a group, and for which· positive or negative sanctions 
are applied to normative obedience and disobedience, respectively 
(Jones & Gerard, 1967). Within the·choice shift, the. issue of norms 
arising from group discussion is unsettled. Cartwright (1971) has 
argued that the CDQ items are·too complex to determine·whether or not a 
norm arises from the-.group discussion. Blascovich, Vea'ch, and Ginsburg 
(1973) and Blascovich and Ginsburg (1974) have attempted to show tbat 
norms do emerge from a risk taking situatiot1.. A realistic· casino 
blackjack game was used. Subjects were tested individually, then placed 
' 
in the betting situation with two experimental confederates who placed 
their bets according to a prea..arranged schedule. Results indicated 
that the mean bets placed by the subjects resembled those placed by 
the confederates. ·In other worlis, subjects conformed to the norm im~ 
·posed by the·confederates. However, the study did not.include·a post;:~ 
test condition where the subjects were tested alone after the group 
session. Without the posttest, one·cannot say if the individuals 
adopted a group norm. 
Evidence that a norm emerges from group discussion is scarce. 
Korger and Briedis (1970) varied the instructional set given to the 
subjects, which presumably varied the relevant social norms elicited 
by the items. ·The manipulations produced differential results, depend-
ent on the directional tendencies generated by the instructions. Others 
have successfully changed the content of the items (Rabow et al., 1966). 
The two studies just cited dealt with societal norms influencing the 
group decision., The Dion et al. (1971) study attempted to determine· if 
a group norm emerged from discussion. They compared the pretest and 
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posttest variance of groups to test the hypothesis that·a group norm 
would decrease the variance of members~ scores during the posttest 
condition. For high cohesive groups, the posttest variance was signi-
ficantly reduced, which suggested a norm had emerged and group members 
had adhered to the norm. These results also·concurred with the· findings 
of Fe.stinger, Schacter and Back. (1950). The question of group discus-
sion generating:emE!rgent norms needs further investigation. 
Purpose of the Study 
Cartwright (1971) has criticized work on the choice shift for 
exclusively using experimental groups to study the underlying causes 
·of shifts. ·He points out: 
that the groups studied have certain 'unnatural'properties. 
-They are creilted for experimental purposes and consequently 
have no history, future, established structure, or signifi~ 
cant enduring relationships with a surrounding social 
system. Results derived .from such groups can be extended to 
groups in general only if. it.is assumed that they are not 
dependent upon these unusual properties. Unfortunately 
almost nothing is known about the effects on group proper-
ties on the basic findings (p. 373). 
As was mentioned in the review section, only three studies have 
attempted to assess the effects group properties would have on the 
choice shift. The two studies that were concerned with the effects of 
status (MacKenzie, 1970; Siegal & Zajonc, 1967) found no effects for 
status. However, status in both studies was in relation to a larger, 
formal. organization, rather than in relation to the status hierarchy 
within a given group structure. After the experimental sessions, the 
group members did not .~:.:;'ftt; "concern themselves with future interaction 
as would members of groups in a natural setting. 
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Dion, Miller and Magnan's (1971) study of the effects of cohesive-
ness on the choice shift used instructions to vary the degree of cohe-
siveness. For high cohesive groups, members were told they had ~een 
matched on the basis of their. similarity in responding to various 
personality and interest questionnaires. ·Members·of low·cohesive 
groups were told that the experimental design was for members to be 
similar, but that there were not enough subjects who were similar; 
therefore, they had to use groups of dissimilar members. Checks on the 
manipulations showed them to be effective. ·However, the study is still 
open to Cartwright's criticism. The affect structure found in groups 
that have developed over time may lead to different results than gener-
ated by the groups in the Dion et al. study. For example, would mem-
bers of such artificial groups censor their thoughts to preserve the 
unity of the group? Since future interaction would not necessarily be 
anticipated, members may .not be concerned with protecting group unity. 
The purpose of the present thesis was to assess the following 
four hypotheses derived from group dynamics concerning the effects 
which group properties have on the choice shift phenomenon. 
Hypothesis 1 
The restatement of the affective bonds hypothesis by Dion et al. 
(1971) implied that as members become more attracted to their group, 
they become less prone to blame others for any·negative outcome of a 
risky decision. This reduced attribution of outcome responsibility was 
postulated to interfere with the diffusion of responsibility, a process 
that has been considered an essential aspect of producing risky deci-
sions by groups. The present study afforded a means for indirectly 
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testing the Dion et al. formulation of the affective bonds hypothesis. 
The groups brought to the experiment a given level of felt cohesive-
ness. If cohesiveness does interfere with a diffusion of responsibility 
process, then the expectation would be for a suppressed shift to occur 
in high cohesive groups, and for a risky shift to be produced by low 
cohesive groups. However, an alternative hypothesis is that status, 
rather than cohesiveness, acts as the determinant of the choice shift, 
in that the status structure of a group creates clear lines of deci-
sional responsibility which would interfere with the diffusion process 
(Jones & Gerarµ, 1967). The status structure, according to this alter-
native, would leave members in the high status position as the recip-
ients of decisional responsibility and thereby induce a cautious set 
for these members. Therefore, the prediction from the status hypothe-
sis would be for cautious shifts across both levels of cohesiveness. 
Hypothesis 2 
This hypothesis, which also concerned cohesiveness, was derived 
from Janis' (1972) contention concerning concurrence-seeking tendencies. 
According to Janis, members of high cohesive groups desire to maintain 
feelings of felt unity within the group, resulting in self-censorship 
of deviate opinions. Such self-censorship would in turn reduce the 
amount of consideration given to alternatives, so that the resulting 
decisions are the product of quick agreement and reduced consideration. 
Support of Janis' contention would be provided if high cohesive groups 
required less discussion time to reach consensus than low cohesive 
groups. 
21 
Hypothesis 3 
This hypothesis predicted that a group norm would emerge from the 
discussion session. Support of the hypothesis would be indicated if 
posttest variance was significantly smaller than the pretest variance 
of the groups. The variance reduction would indicate that the group 
members had accepted a particular set of arguments presented in the 
group discussion, which favored a given alternative. When faced again 
with responding as individuals, the group experience would provide 
guidelines for the choice selection. Disconfirmation of the hypothesis 
would suggest that the shift process was due to individual membervs 
ability to assert influence. 
Hypothesis 4 
The present thesis employed Bales' (1970) Interpersonal Process 
Analysis (IPA). According to Bales, the IPA provides an indication of 
the amount of power each member has shown during a given interaction. 
The IPA system was used to derive a leader from the group session, 
making it possible to test Sherif and Sherif 1 s (1969) hypothesis that 
in novel situations the leader possesses the greatest amount of influ= 
ence over the group. Furthermore, the present study also allowed a 
direct test of release theory. By subtracting the group choices from 
the choices of the extreme risk member and from the leadervs initial 
choices, it was possible to determine if either approach significantly 
increased prediction accuracy. Support for Sherif and Sherif's hypo-
thesis would result from the leader and group decisions being similar. 
Release theory would be supported if the group decisions resembled the 
extreme risk member's initial choices. 
CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY 
Subjects 
Ten class-project-work-groups, consisting of 27 female and 28 male 
Oklahoma State University students enrolled in two sections of Psychol-
ogy 3743, served as subjects. Subjects received course credit for 
participating. At the beginning of the spring semester the students 
were formed into groups for work on class projects. The projects con-
sisted of two group research papers, both of which were important to 
the individual member's final grade, plus several assignments concerned 
with summarizing text material and preparing for course tests. The 
groups met in class at least once per week, with the total number of 
meetings, prior to the group session, ranging between 18 and 24 depend-
ing upon the class section. The groups also met outside the class to 
work on projects or to socialize. The number of such meetings varied 
widely among the groups. During the semester, neither the instructor 
nor the text mentioned the choice shift phenomenon; therefore, it 
seemed safe to conclude the subjects were naive as to the purpose of the 
study. 
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Instruments 
CDQ Items 
Items 4, 5, 6, and 12 from the original 12 CDQ items (see Appendix) 
were selected for the present study. The "typical" shift for these 
items, expressed as the median of themean·shifts· in odds, are for item 
4, 1.6, for item 6, .a, for item 5, -.1, and for item 12, -.6 (Cart-
wright, 1971). ·Items 4 and 6·are labeled risky items, and were 
selected on the basis of their previous use when the full set is not 
employed (Burnstein & Vinokur, 1973; Burnstein, Vinokur & Trope, 1973; 
Vinokur & Burnstein, 1974). ·Items 5 and 12, which are·the·cautious 
items, are the only two in the original set that yield reliable shifts 
toward caution (Cartwright, 1971). A reduced set was employed due to 
time limitations and expenses. 
Status Measures 
Two measures were used to determine the group's status hierarchy. 
The first consisted of members' responses to the question, ''Who shows 
most effective initiative in the group?" The members were asked to 
rank all members of the group, including themselves. The rankings from 
group members were combined, so that an individual's status position 
was determined by the summation of the entire group's ranking of that 
individual. Res·ponses to the question were taken twice, first at one 
week prior to the group session, and second at one week.after the group 
session. Both measures were·taken during a regular class meeting, and 
discussion was not allowed. 
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Effective initiative was chosen as the· status criterion for the 
following reasons: (a) In the course, both the instructor and the text 
(Sherif & Sherif, 1969) define status in terms of effective initiative, 
and (b) effective initiative, defined as a member 9 s ability to initiate 
policy, decisions and activities (Sherif & Sherif, 1969; p. 170), was 
the main concern in relation to the study. 
The second measure of status was derived from the use of Bales 9 
Interaction Process Analysis (IPA). The IPA consists of twelve cate-
gories concerned with how individuals communicate to one another. The 
categories are labeled: seems friendly, dramatizes, agrees, gives 
suggestions, gives opinion, gives informa.tion, asks for information, 
asks for opinion, asks for suggestions, disagrees, shows tension, and 
seems unfriendly. The.IPA does not classify what is said, as do methods 
concerned with content analysis, but rather breaks interaction down 
into "who does what to whom.in the process (time order) of the inter-
action" (Bales, 1970; p. 92). Furthermore, the use of the IPA is not 
restricted to verbal statements, but also includes nonverbal behavior. 
For,example, "shows tension" may be extracted from facial express:ions, 1 
as may several of the other categories. 
Two judges were trained in the use of the IPA. Training consisted 
of six sessions which were conducted as follows: (a) The first session 
consisted of the two judges discussing the definitions of each category 
with the investigator. The purpose of this session was to clarify 
definitions so that the judges had a common framework from which to 
draw. (b) The second meeting involved the judges categorizing inter-
actions among three individuals. After the interaction, the judges 
discussed their uses of the categories, in an attempt to further clarify 
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definitions. (c) This session was the same as the second. (d) The 
interactions of four individuals were judged, and discussion of category 
usages followed. (e) The actors were instructed to use nonverbal 
behavior as much as possible, so that the judges could be tested in 
their· ability to detect such communications. Jnterrater agreement 
after this session reached only .67 (67%). At conclusion of the inter-
action, the judges and investigator discussed the scoring of nonverbal 
behavior. (f) The interaction between five individuals was scored by 
the judges. Actors were again instructed to use nonverbal behavior. 
Interrater agreement on the session reached .84, a level which seemed 
acceptable since .80 was the desired level prior to the start of 
training. 
After training was completed, judges made independent ratings of 
the group sessions from videotape replays. Ratings were recorded on 
score pads that were taken from Bales (1970; p. 93). Interrater relia-
bility for scoring of the group session based on rankings of total 
initiative gave a Spearman's .Es of .97. 
Status rankings were derived from the IPA in the following pianner: 
The total of all acts each member initiated was summed for that indi-
vidual. Then the group members were rank-ordered by the total acts 
initiated. According to Bales (1970), "This total is closely related 
both to the amount of time consumed by the person, and to the-amount 
of power he has tried to exercise in the given session" (p. 73). 
Furthermore, this rank•ordering tends to approximate the status hier-
archy the group brings into the lab. 
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Cohesive Measures 
Two measures of cohesiveness were used. The first was concerned 
with interpersonal attraction among members (Bovard, 1951), while the 
second measured attraction toward the group as a whole (Jackson, 1959). 
Members' attraction toward one another was measured by an eleven point 
rating scale, a method previously employed by Bovard (1951). An exam-
ple of the instructions and the scale follows: 
On the following scale, please place a check on the line that 
most accurately describes the degree of liking you have for 
each member of your group. In the space to the right of each 
scale, please write the name of the member you are rating. 
For example, if you like a member a great deal, then you would 
place a check as follows: 
Strongly 
Dislike 
_____ _x_ 
Strongly 
Like 
If you do not like a member, then you would check as follows: 
x 
Strongly 
Dislike 
Strongly 
Like 
If you do not particularly like or dislike a member, then 
you would check as follows: 
x 
--- --- ~- --- ~- --- --- --- ~- --- ---Strongly 
Dislike 
Strongly 
Like 
Your true degree of liking for each member is of major 
concern. Please complete the scales as accurately as 
possible. 
The second measure consisted of responses on a six inch line to the 
question, "How much do you like your group?" Subjects were instructed 
to make a slash on the line to reflect their degree of attraction to 
the group. An example follows: 
How much do you like your group? 
Not at All Very, Very Much 
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The measure was taken twice, one week before.and one week.after 
the group session. The -question was administered during the same class 
session as the status measure. To check the reliability of Bovard's 
method against the attraction.to the group, a Spearman's !.s was computed 
based on the rankings of total scores for the two methods. Spearman's 
E.s was .93, lending support to the assumption that the two levels of 
cohesiveness had been accurately determined. Further support was provi-
ded by the finding that the two levels differed sigl'!.ificantly on 
Bovard's method,! (8) = 2.83, .E,(.025. 
Pracedure 
Pretesting 
Pretesting occurred during a regular class meeting for both sec-
tions, 10 days prior to the graup session. The subjects were told that 
their·professor was investigating the adequacy of the Student Opinion 
Questionnaire; however, the initial sample size was too small for any 
firm conclusions to be drawn. Therefore, the profes.sor wished for each 
student to complete a sample.of items from the questionnaire. They 
were then given two baoklets, one containing the four items, while the 
other contained the choices •. After completing the questionnaire, the 
class continued in the regular manner. 
Group Session 
The group session took two class days. After roll had been called, 
the students were asked to gather into their groups. The experimenter 
went to the classroom and called a group number. That group was then 
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taken to a large classroom and asked to take a seat. There were nine 
chairs arranged in a semi-circle, with the camera facing the front and 
a microphone located in the center of the semi-circle .. After the 
question-and-answer booklet had been given to each subject, the follow-
ing instructions were read: 
Dr. MacNeil (the course professor) and I are currently 
training several observers· in methods of analyzing group 
interactions. To aide in the training, we have decided to 
make films of group interaction during decision-making on 
various problems. The films will be shown to the observers 
.so that we may train them to recognize various group 
properties. 
The problems you will be discussing are items from the 
Student Opinion Questionnaire that you completed earlier 
this semester. These items were selected since your previous 
exposure to them should allow the discussion to occur more 
completely. You will recall that the items dealt with th~ 
·probabilities associated with certain behavioral outcomes. 
The group's task is to read each item, then discuss the 
problem until the group reaches agreement on the lowest 
probability level acceptable before the group would advise 
the individual in the problem to take a particular action. 
That is, the group as a whole must reach consensus on the 
lowest acceptable probability level for that problem. Once 
consensus has been reached, each of you are to record the 
group's decision for that problem in your answer booklet. 
Please be sure to mark the level which the group has chosen. 
Are there any questions? 
To help you adjust to being filmed, I would like each 
person to state his name, hometown, major in college, and 
college class level. - Begin with the person on the far 
left, and continue clockwise. Please begin. 
(After completion of the above~) You may now start 
your task. Please consider the problems in the order they 
appear in your booklet. 
While the subjects discussed the items, the experimenter, using a 
stopwatch, timed the discussion for each problem. The timing began 
with the first word spoken concerning the problem, and ended when 
agreement was reached. 
When the subjects had completed the four-items, they were-taken 
back to the classraom after being asked not to discuss the procedure 
with members-of other groups. -Then the next graup was taken to the 
experimental room, and the procedure continued until all ten groups 
had participated. 
· Posttesting 
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Posttesting also occurred during a regular class session, 10 days 
after the group session. The experimenter explained that the professor 
had decided to gather information related to the full Student Opinion 
.Questionnaire, which consisted of 12 items. Therefore, he would like 
them to provide responses. The students were given the question and 
answer booklets and asked not to discuss the items. -After they 
completed all items, the class cantinued with a regular session. 
Debriefing 
Debriefing occurred immediately after the posttest had been per~ 
formed. Subjects were told a brief history of the choice shift, its 
meaning, and finally, each hypothesis and what was expected. 
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
Hypothesis 1 
A 2 x 2 x 2 split-plot analysis. of variance, with testing period 
and items as the within·variables, was·used to determine the·effect that 
cohesiveness has·on the·choice shift (Table I). The first testing 
period refers to the difference scores generated by subtracting the 
group decision from the·pre~group mean of the individaals composing 
the group. Testing Period 2 is the difference scores produced by sub-
tracting the post-group mean from the group condition. 
Table I shows that a significant Cohesiveness main,effect, 
! (1, 8) = 6.88, .E,(.05, a significant Cohesiveness X Testing Period 
interaction, ]: (l,· 8) = 6.44, .E.<~05, and a significant Testing Per.iod X 
Items interaction, ! (1, 8) = 24.83, .E.<.01, was found for the shift data. 
Means for the Cohesiveness_X Testing Period interaction.are·shown in 
Table II, and the simple effects tests (Winer, 1971) are listed in 
Table III. Cohesiveness was most influential during the first testing 
period, ! (1, 14) = l~.46, .E,(.01. Since high cohesive groups showed 
cautious shifts, and low cohesive groups displayed risky shifts, the 
results replicated the find,ings of Dion, Miller and Magnan (1971). 
However, the finding that high cohesive groups differed significantly 
between testing periods, ! (1, 8) =5.92, .E.(.0,5, was not expected. 
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This result suggested that high cohesive groups were dissatisfied with 
their group decisions, and moved away from the group during the post= 
test indivudual condition. Low cohesive groups did not differ signif-
icantly between testing period,!'. (1, 8) = 2.74, .E.<•25. 
Sc:mrce 
Between Groups 
TABLE I 
SUMMARY OF SPLIT~PLOT ANALYSIS 
OF VARIANCE FOR SHIFT 
df MS 
Cohesiveness (A) 1 10.19 
Groups w. Levels 8 1.48 
Within Groups 
Testing Period (B) 1 0 77 
AXB 1 25.96 
BX Groups w. Levels 8 3.09 
Items (C) 1 8. 07 
A X C 1 5.06 
c x Groups w. Levels 8 1.55 
B X C 1 49.42 
AX BX C 1 9.13 
.,.~ p<.05 
*"k p(.01 
F 
6.88* 
1 
8.44* 
5.21 
3.26 
24. 83"/d( 
4.58 
TABLE II 
MEAN·· SHIFT AS A FUNCTION. OF COHESIVENESS 
AND TESTING PERIOD 
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Testing Period One Testing Period Two 
High Cohesive -1.20 1.14 
Low·Cohesive 1.3.9 = .• 02 
The .significant Testing PeriocL.X Items interaction. in Table I 
indicated .that the items used for risk and caution did produce differ-
ences in the direction of the decisions. Reference to Table·III shows 
that risk and caution items produced differences across both· testing 
periods. Table IV lists the mean shift of each type of item during 
the two testing periods •. During the testing periods, risk items pro-
duced risky shifts, ! (1, 15) = 7.21, .E:<.05, and cautious items lead to 
cautious shifts, ! (1, 15) = 12.55, .E.<· 01. This finding supported the 
use of the different items to measure types· of shift. 
Source 
A at Bi 
A at B2 
Pooled Error 
B at Al 
B .at A2 
B:X Subj. w. Groups 
B·at C1 
B at C2 
Pooled· Error 
C at Bl 
C atB2 
·Pooled Error 
* p(.05 
** p(;Ol 
TABLE III 
SUMMARY OF SIMPLE EFFECTS 
TESTS· ON SHIFT 
df MS 
1 34.75 
1 1.66 
14 2.79 
1 18.28 
1 8.46 
8 3.09 
1 18.31 
1 31.88 
15 2.54 
1 48.86 
1 8.62 
16 1.77 
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F 
12.46** 
1 
5.92* 
2.74 
7.21* 
12.55** 
27.60** 
4.87* 
.·TABLE IV 
MEAN SHIFT AS A FUNCTION OF 
TESTING PERIOD AND ITEMS 
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Risk Items Caution Items 
Testing Period One 1. 79 -1.59 
Testing Period Two .04 1.08 
Hypothesis 2 
Janis' (1972) contention.concerning the·effects of cohesiveness 
on decision time was assessed by a 2 x 2 split ... plot analcysisof vari-
nee, with items serving as the within factor. Table V gives the summary 
for this analysi$. The Cohesiveness main effect, ! (1, 8) = 16.84, 
.E<.01, indicated high cohesive groups required sig:imificantlyless deci= 
sion time (,!:! = 2.38 minutes) :to reach consensus than did low cahesive 
groups ~ = 6.05). This result supported Janis' hypothesis that high 
cohesiveness· leads to self=censorship by members· of their divergent 
0pinion$, in order not to disrupt the felt unity of the group. 
·Further investigation of Janis' concurrence ... seeking tendencies 
was performed by computing Spearman's E.s, for each group, using the 
group status ranking prior .to group discussion and tha status rankings 
provided by Bales' IPA. The size of E.s for high:.cohesive groups ranged 
from .63 to 1.00. For low cohesive groups E.s ranged1 from .OO to .75 . 
. Also supporting Janis was the stability coefficient computed by deri-
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ving Spearman's !.s for each group between the two sociegram sessions. 
Stability for high cohesive groups varied between .65 and LOO, while 
for low cohesive groups the range was between .09 and .75. These Es 
values suggested that high cohesive groups wasted little time in trying 
to establish power positions once the status hierarchy became structured. 
The members adhered to the structure not only between testing periods, 
. but also during the group discussion" The status hierarchy may be one 
explanation for the reduced decision time found with high cohesive 
groups. 
Source 
Between Subjects 
Cohesiveness (A) 
Subj. w. ,Groups 
Within Subjects 
Items (B) 
AX B 
TABLE V 
SUMMARY OF SPL!T:PLOT ANALYSIS OF 
VARIANCE FOR DECISION TIME 
df MS 
1 59.79 
8 3.55 
1 26.55 
1 5.52 
BX Subj. w. Groups 8 3.46 
~'< p(. 05 
*"I~ p(.01 
F 
16 0 84*~'< 
7.67* 
1.61 
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Hypothesis 3 
To determine if a group norm emerged from the discussion session 
a 2 x 2 x 2 split-plot anal~sis of variance was performed, using testing 
period and items as the repeated measures (Table VI). Pretest variance 
and posttest variance served as the dependent variables. As predicted, 
a significant Testing Period main effect occurred, E (1, 8) = 7.81, 
£(.05. The mean pretest variance was 2.67, and the mean posttest 
variance was 1.96. 
Although the results suggested that a group norm did emerge from 
item discussion, the results were not necessarily supportive of the 
hypothesis. In Table II, the mean shift during testing period two for 
high cohesive groups was away from the group decisions (~ = 1.14). Low 
cohesive groups showed greater adherence to the decisions generated by 
their groups (M = -.02). The implication was that low cohesive groups 
did produce a group norm which members followed. Since these groups 
required more decision time to reach consensus, it seemed likely that a 
more complete consideration was given to the various arguments favoring 
each attractive alternative. Apparently, by dealing with the arguments 
elicited by each alternative, low cohesive group members were provided 
with the arguments favored by co-members. When removed from the group 
situation, the members expressed the choices which received endorsement 
from others. 
Source 
Between Groups 
Cohesiveness (A) 
TABLE VI 
SUMMARY OF SPLIT-PLOT ANALYSIS OF 
VARIANCE FOR GROUP VARIANCES 
df MS 
1 .99 
Groups w. Levels 8 .29 
Within Groups 
Testing Period (B) 1 1.25 
AX B 1 .24 
B X Groups w. Levels 8 .16 
Items (C) 1 .32 
A X C 1 .26 
C.X Groups w. Levels 8 .23 
BX C 1 .11 
AXBXC 1 .13 
BC. X Groups w. Levels 8 • 03 
'>'~p(. 05 
37 
F 
3 .41 
7.81* 
1.50 
1.39 
Ll3 
3.67 
4.33 
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Hypothesis 4 
A 2 x 2 analysis of variance was computed for risk and for caution 
items, to assess the ac~uracy of Sherif and Sherif's (1969) hypothesis 
that the group leader exerts the greatest influence in group decision-
making, and to test release theoryas contention that the group shifts 
toward the extreme risk member (Pruitt, 1971). Table VII .gives the 
results for risk items and Table X provides the summary for caution 
items. 
Source 
Cohesiveness (A) 
Method (B) 
TABLE VII 
SUMMARY.ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
FOR. RISK ITEMS 
df MS 
1 .45 
1 .25 
F 
1 
1 
AXB 1 9.45 8.22* 
W. Cell 16 1.15 
*p<.05 
High Cohesive 
Low Cohesive 
Source 
A at Bi 
A at B2 
B at Ai 
B at A2 
W. Cell 
* p(.05 
TABLE VIII 
MEAN DIFFERENCES AS A FUNCTION OF 
COHESIVENESS AND METHOD 
Leader 
.3 
Li 
TABLE IX 
SUMMARY OF SIMPLE EFFECTS TESTS 
FOR DIFFERENCE SCORES 
df MS 
i 6.40 
i 3.50 
i 8.46 
i 1.24 
i6 l. i5 
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High Risk 
1.2 
.7 
F 
5.57* 
3.04 
7.36* 
1.08 
Source 
Cohesiveness (A) 
Method (B) 
W. Cell 
TABLE X 
SUMIY,IARY OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
FOR CAUTION ITEMS 
df MS 
1 .20 
1 .80 
1 .20 
16 2.43 
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F 
1 
1 
1 
The significant Cohesiveness:X Method interaction, ! (1, 16) = 8.22, 
£(.05, in Table VII was broken into the simple effects shown in Table 
IX. Mean differences for cohesiveness across method are given in Table 
VIII. Simple effects tests indicated that leaders in high cohesive 
groups were more successful in influencing other members than were 
leaders of low cohesive groups, f (1, 16) = 5.57, E<.05. The high risk 
member's influence was similar for both levels of cohesiveness, 
! (1, 16) = 3.04, .E).10, and was not as great as the.influence asserted 
by the leader in high cohesive groups, ! (1, 16) = 7.26, £(.05. Neither 
the leader nor the high risk member improved prediction accuracy for 
low cohesive groups, ! (1, 16) =- 1.08, £).25. ·For caution items, 
neither method improved prediction of the resultant group decision, as 
all F values were less than 1. 
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The results did not provide clear support for either method. For 
high cohesive groups, the leader did provide significantly more accurate 
prediction of the group choice on risk items. In low cohesive groups, 
there was a non-significant shift toward the high-risk member's position. 
Although these results suggested release theory may be applicable only 
for aggregate groups, such as the experimental groups traditionally 
employed, it should be noted that release theory postulates only that 
the extreme risk member serves as a release mechanism for the other 
group members. Therefore, advocates of release theory could argue that 
the extreme member did provide a release from the constraining forces 
of a percieved moderation value, and that the shift toward the leader 
resulted from the release. The implications the results have for 
release theo~y will not be clear until a means of resolving this issue 
is found. 
For caution items, neither hypothesis 1 was confirmed. Apparently 
some other mechanism was functioning during the duscussion of the 
caution items. Again, release theory can accommodate the findings by 
arguing that the extreme cautious member provided the release for moving 
toward caution. The fact that a cautious shift did occur on these items 
supports the contention. Furthermore, recall that Kelley and Thibaut 
(1969) suggested risk arguments may be more persuasive than arguments 
favoring caution. In relation to an extreme caution member, moderate 
arguments are in favor of more risky altermatives. Perhaps moderate 
choices were supported by more persuasive arguments, so that the 
resultant shift was toward the moderate group members, 
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
Cohesiveness 
The results have indicated that cohesiveness plays an important 
role in group decision-making. Regardless of item type, high cohesive 
groups shifted toward caution, low cohesive groups moved toward risk. 
Combining these findings with those of Dion et al. (1971), strength was 
added to the assumption that inter-member attraction influences the 
amount and direction of group risk-taking. The explanation advanced 
by Dion et al., that high cohesive groups are not willing to diffuse 
decision responsibility away from themselves and onto other members, 
appears capable of partly accounting for the findings. However, the 
explanation does not explain why high cohesi~e groups shifted toward 
risk during the posttest condition, while low cohesive groups showed 
little shift during the posttest. The analysis for decision time sheds 
some light on this problem. 
Decision time analysis revealed that high cohesive groups required 
significantly less time to reach consensus, than did low cohesive 
groups. This finding supports Janis' (1972) contention that high cohe-
siveness leads to self-censorship by members of their divergent opinions, 
in order not to disrupt the felt unity of the group. If this contention 
is accurate, then it would seem reasonable to assume that high cohesive 
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group members proposed alternatives with a high probability of success, 
so that consensus could be reached without lengthy and potentially 
disruptive discussion. The shift toward risk on the posttest supports 
the contention, as the shift suggests that although members yielded to 
the majority's desires during the group session, they were not satisfied 
with the group's decisions, and shifted toward risk once they were 
removed from the group condition. 
Collectively, these results imply that cohesiveness affects the 
choice shift by reducing the number of arguments presented during 
group discussion. The reduced decision time for high cohesive groups 
implied that full consideration of the alternatives was not given. The 
shift to risk on the posttest suggests that the arguments which led the 
members to choose more risky alternatives during the pretest wer~ not 
resolved by group discussion, even though more cautious decisions were 
produced by the groups. The risky choices remained attractive, and the 
arguments presented in the group discussion did not decrease the attrac-
tion of the risky pool of arguments. When removed from the group for 
the posttest condition, members' dec.isions were more influenced by the 
risky set than by the cautious set. 
For low cohesive groups, more complete consideration was given 
to the alternatives.' Through discussion, members were.allowed to de-
termine the value attached to each pool of arguments elicited by the 
alternatives. This more complete discussion provided the material 
necessary for members to resolve their attraction to alternatives other 
than the one favored by the group. In other words, members were 
provided with convincing support for the alternative favored by the 
group. Therefore, their selections during the posttest condition were 
similar to their group's decisions. 
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If the above contentions are supported by future research, then a 
note of qualification should be made concerning the effects of cohesive-
ness in decision-making for groups in general. Recall that in Chapter 
I research was presented which suggested that cohesiveness increased 
adherence to group decisions (Festinger, Schacter & Back, 1950). The 
present results imply that the effect of cohesiveness is to reduce the 
amount of consideration given to the various alternatives. Adherence 
to the group decision appears to be influenced by the amount of logical 
support the group is able to generate for its decisions. If the groups 
do not provide the support, then adherence to the decision is signifi= 
cantly reduced, regardless of the degree of felt cohesiveness. 
It was also noted in Chapter I that cohesiveness seemed to increase 
the.ability of the group to exert influence over its members (Cart-
wright & Zander, 1968). This hypothesis was indirectly supported by 
the decision time analysis, since high cohesive groups were able to 
reach consensus in significantly less time than low cohesive groups. 
The implication is that high cohesive groups were.able to assert greater 
influence over deviant members. Future research needs to deal directly 
with this implication, as it suggests that faulty decision-making in 
policy-making groups may result partially from the ability of groups 
to influence their members. Furthermore, cohesiveness appears .to be 
the variable which allows increased influence to be.achieved (Janis, 
1972). 
A second issue which needs further consideration concerns the 
failure of high cohesive group members to adhere to the group decisions. 
One possible variable which may increase adherence is social responsi-
bility for decisional outcomes. In the present study, the groups dealt 
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with an entirely hypothetical situation. Without concern for the feed~ 
back to the group, members may not concern themselves with the adequacy 
of their decisions. If decision responsibility were increased, then 
members may become more concerned with the outcome generated by their 
decisions. This could result in more complete discussion, less concern 
for felt unity, and close.r adherence in the decisions. Janis v conten= 
tion concernip.g concurrence~seeking tendencies may not hold when groups 
feel directly responsible for the.outcomes. Future research needs to 
assess the effects of responsibility using groups with·an·interaction 
history. 
Group Norm 
The results indicated that a group norm emerged from discussion 
of the CDQ items. From the arguments presented in the preceeding 
section, one can speculate that discussion de~emphasizes the values 
elicited by most alternatives, and provides focus for the values gen.er= 
ated by the favored alternative. In the posttest condition, the members 
apparently reacted to the questions by focusing on the values.that led 
to the group.vs choices, particularly the members of low cohesive groups. 
The·above arguments are opposite to those presented by Cartwright 
(1971) and Blascovich and'Ginsburg (1974). ·These authors contend that 
the CDQ items do not elicit one set of social values and norms, making 
it impossible for groups to generate a single norm from discussion. 
The present results imply that if discussion is adequate, the values 
supported by the·group·are used by members when forced to decide.alone, 
. indicating that a norm does emerge from discussion. 
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Status 
Clear support was not provided for Sherif and Sherie s (1969) 
contention that in novel situations, the leader 7 s influence over the 
group is increased. For risk items, the-leader's initial chaice did 
improve prediction accuracy for high· cohesive groups, but not for low 
cohesive groups. Apparently, as indicated by the stability coeffi.., 
cients, cohesiveness increases the degree to which a group follows the 
status structure, which accounts for the failure of the hypothesis with 
low cohesive groups. 
With cautious items, the leader 9 s choices did not improve predic= 
tion. One could argue that Janis 7 concurrence=seeking tendencies 
can account for the failure with cautious items. If members do censor 
divergent opinions, then it is reasonable to assume that high status 
members are also subjected to the same tendency. 'Wet, this interpre"' 
tation is contradictory to the one given for risk items. Again, a 
manipulation of perceived social responsibility may help to resolve 
the controversy. A fitm conclusion concerning Sherif and Sherifvs 
hypothesis, as applied to the choice shift, cannot be made at the 
present. 
Conclusions 
Overall, the results have shown that group dynamics do.affect the 
resulting decisions of groups. High levels of cohesiveness generate 
close adherence to the status structure and concurrence=seeking tenden= 
cies are associated with an avoidance of risky alternatives during 
group discussion. Cohesive groups requi.re less time to reach consensus, 
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and apparently do not give complete consideration to each·alternative 
available. When re.moved from the group condition, mempers are less 
inclined to adhere to the group decisions than are members of low 
cohesive groups. The low cohesive groups appeared to give .more com-
plete consideration to the available alternatives, so that a common set 
of values are used by members when faced alone with the same items. 
In other words, when adequate discussion is given to the items, a 
group norm emerges from the group situation. 
Unfortunately, the results do not provide a clear determination 
of the agent of social influences during group discussion. The leader 
does assert influence, bµt the con~entions of release theory were not 
completely discredited. It was concluded that future research needs 
to further investigate the predictions of release theory. 
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APPENDIX 
CHOICE DILEMMA QUESTIONN..AIRE 
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1. Mr. A, an electrical engineer, who is married and has one child, 
has been working for a large electronics corporation since gradua-
ting from college five years ago. He is assured of a lifetime job 
with a modest, though adequate, salary, and liberal pension bene-
fits upon retirement. On the other harid, it is very unlikely that 
his salary will increase much before he retires. While attending 
a convention, Mr. A is offered a job with a small, newly founded 
company which has a highly uncertain future. The new job would 
pay more to start and would offer the possibility of a share in the 
ownership if the company survived the competition of the larger 
firms. 
Imagine that you are advising Mr. A. Listed below are several 
probabilities or odds of the new company's proving financially 
sound. 
PLEASE CHECK THE LOWEST PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD CONSIDER 
ACCEPTABLE TO MAKE IT WORTHWHILE FOR MR. A TO TAKE THE NEW JOB. 
_____ The chances are 1 in 10 that the company will prove financially 
sound. 
_____ The chances are 2 in 10 that the company will prove financially 
sound. 
The chances are 3 in 10 that the company will prove financially 
-----sound. 
The chances are 4 in 10 that the company will prove financially 
sound. 
_____ The chances are 5 in 10 that the company will prove financially 
sound. 
The chances are 6 in 10 that the company will prove financially 
sound. 
The chances are 7 in 10 that the company will prove financia~ly 
sound. 
The chances are 8 in 10 that the company will prove financially 
sound. 
The chances are 9 in 10 that the company will prove financially 
sound. 
_____ Place a check here if you think Mr. A should not take the new 
job no matter what the probabilities. 
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2. Mr. B, a 45-year old accountant, has recently been informed by his 
physician that he has developed a severe heart ailment. The disease 
would be sufficiently serious to force Mr. B to change many of his 
strongest life habits--reducing his work lead, drastically changing 
his diet, giving up favorite leisure time pursuits. The physician 
suggests that a delicate medical operation could be attempted which, 
if successful, would completely relieve the heart condition. But 
its success could not be assured, and in fact, the operation might 
prove fatal. 
Imagine that you are advising Mr. B. Listed below are several 
probabilities or odds that the operation will prove successful. 
PLEASE CHECK THE LOWEST PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD CONSIDER 
ACCEPTABLE FOR THE OPERATION TO BE PER.FONMED. 
______ Place a check here if you think Mr. B should !!2J: have the operation 
no matter what the probabilities. 
The chances are 9 in 10 that the operation will be a success. 
---
_'The chances are 8 in 10 that the operation will be a success. 
~---The chances are 7 in 10 that the operation will be a success. 
-----.The chances are 6 in 10 that the operation will be a success. 
The chances are 5 in 10 that the operation will be a success. 
---
The chances are 4 in 10 that the operation will be a success. 
---
The chances are 3 in 10 that the operation will be a success. 
---
~~The chances are 2 in 10 that the operation will be a success. 
The chances are 1 in 10 that the operation will be a success. 
---
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3.,, Mr.· C, a married man with two children, has a steady job that pays 
him about $6000 per year. He·can easily afford the necessities of 
life, but few of the luxuries. Mr. C's father, who died recently, 
carried a $4000 life insurance policy. Mr. C would like to invest 
th!Ls money in stocks. He is well aware of the secure ublue""chip" 
stocks and bonds that would pay approximately 6% on his investment. 
·On the other hand, Mr. Chas heard that the stocks of a relatively 
unknown Company X might double their present value if a new product 
currently in production is favorably received by the buying public. 
However, if the product is unfavorably received, the stocks would 
decline in value. 
Imagine that you are advising Mr. C. Listed below are several 
probabilities or odds that Company X stocks will double their 
value. 
PLEASE CHECK THE LOWEST PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD CONSIDER 
ACCEPTABLE FOR ME. C TO INVEST IN COMPANY·X STOCKS. 
__ The· chances· are 1 in 10 that the stocks will double their value. 
~The chances are 2 in 10 that the stocks will double their value. 
The chances are 3 in 10 that the stocks will double their value. 
---
The chances are 4 in 10 that the .stocks will double their value. 
---
The chances are 5 in 10 that the stocks will double their value. 
---
The chances are 6 in 10 that the stocks will double their·value. 
---
__ The chances are 7 in 10 that the stocks will double their value. 
The chances are 8 in 10 that the stocks will double their value. 
---
~-The chances are 9 in 10 that the stocks will double their value. 
-~-Place a check here if you think Mr. C should nQJ:_ invest in Company 
. X stocks no matter what the probabilities. 
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4. Mr. D is the captain of College xvs football team. College X is 
playing its traditional rival, College Y, in the final game of the 
season. The game is in its final seconds, and Mr. Dus team, College 
X, is behind in the score. College X has time to run one more 
play. Mr. D~ the captain, must decide whether it would be best to 
settle for a tie score with a play which would be almost certain to 
work; or, on the other hand, should he·try a more complicated and 
risky play which could bring victory if it succeeded, but defeat 
if not. 
Imagine that you are advising Mr. D. Listed below are several 
probabilities or odds that the risky play will work. 
PLEASE CHECK THE.LOWEST PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD CONSIDER 
ACCEPI'ABLE FOR THE RISKY PLAY TO BE ATTEMPTED. 
~---Place a check here if you think Mr. D should B:2! attempt the 
risky play no matter what the probabilities. 
____ The chances are 9 in 10 that the risky play will work. 
The chances are 8 in 10 that the risky play will work. 
---
__ .__ The chances are 7 in 10 that the risky play will work. 
The chances are 6 in 10 that the risky play will work. 
---
~~-The chances are 5 in 10 that the risky play will work. 
~The chances are 4 in 10 that the risky play will work. 
___ The chances are 3 in 10 that the risky play will work. 
____ The chances are 2 in 10 that the risky play will work. 
--~-The chances are 1 in 10 that the risky play will work. 
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S. Mr. E is president of a light metals corporation in the United 
States. The corporation is quite prosperous, and has strongly 
considered the possibilities of business expansion by building an 
additional plant in a new·location. 1'he·choice is between b11ilding 
another- plant in the U. S., where there would be·a moderate return 
on the initial investment, or building a plant in·. a foreign 
country. Lower labor costs and .easy access to raw materials in that 
country would mean a much higher return on the initial investment. 
On the· other hand, there is a history of political instability and 
revolution in the foreign country under consideratio~. In fact, 
the leader of a small monority party·is committed to nationalizing, 
that is, taking over, all foreign investments. 
Imagine that you are advising Mr. E. Listed below are several 
probabilities·or odds of continued political stability in the 
foreign country under consideration. 
PLEASE CHECK THE LOWEST PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD CONSIDER 
ACCEPrABLE FOR MR. E'S CORPORATION TO BUILD A PLANT IN THAT 
COUNTRY. 
The chances are 1 in 10 that the foreign country will remain 
---politically stable. 
The chances are 2 in 10 that the foreign country will remain 
---politically stable. 
The·chances are 3 in 10 that the foreign country will remain 
---politically stable. 
The chances are 4 in 10 that the foreign country will remain 
---politically stable. 
The chances are 5 in 10 that the foreign country will remain 
---politically stable. 
The chanc®s are 6 in 10 that the foreign country will remain 
---politically stable. 
~--The chances are 7 in 10 that the foreign country will remain 
politically stable. 
The chances are 8 in 10 that the foreign country will remain 
---politically stable. 
The chances are 9 in 10 that the foreign country will remain 
---politically stable. 
___ Place a check here if you think Mr. E's corporation·should ~ 
build a plant in the foreign country, no matter what the 
probabilities. 
6. Mr. F is currently a college senior who is very eager to pursue 
graduate study in chemistry·leading·to the Doctor of Philosophy 
degree. He has been.accepted by both University X and University 
58 
Y. While a degree from University X would signify·outstanding 
training in this field, the standards are so very rigorous that only 
a fraction of the degree candidates actually recieve the degree. 
University Y, on the other hand, has much less of a reputation in 
chemistry, but almost everyone admitted is awarded the Doctor of 
Philosophy degree, though the degree bas much less prestige than 
the corresponding degree from University·X. 
Imagine that you are advising Mr. F. Listed below are several 
probabilities or odds that Mr. F would be awarded a degree at 
University X, the· one with the greater prestige. 
PLEASE CHECK THE LOWEST PROBABILITY' THAT YOU WOULD CONSIDER 
ACCEP:rABLE TO MAKE IT WORTHWHILE FOR M.R. F TO ENROLL IN UNIVERSITY 
X RATHER THAN UNIVERSITY Y. 
___ Place a check here if you think Mr. F should~ enroll in 
University X, no matter what the probabilities. 
The chances are 9 in 10 that Mr. F would receive a degree from 
---University X. 
___ The chances are 8 in 10 that Mr. F would receive a degree from 
University X. 
The chances are 7 in 10 that Mr. F would receive a degree from 
---University X. 
The chances are 6 in 10 that Mr. F would receive a degree from 
---University X. 
The·chances are 5 in 10 that Mr. F would receive a degree from 
University X. 
The·chances are 4 in 10 that Mr. !!' would receive a degree from 
University X. 
The chances are 3 in 10 that Mr. F would receive -a degree from 
University X. 
The chances are 2 in 10 that Mr. .F would receive ·a degree from 
University X. 
The chances are 1in10 that Mr. F would receive-a degree from 
---University X. 
7. Mr. G, a competent chess player, is participating in a national 
chess tournament. In an early match he draws the top-favored 
player in the tournament as his opponent. Mr. G has been given 
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a relatively low ranking in view of his performance in previous 
tournaments. During the course of his play with the top-favored 
man, Mr. G notes the possibility of a deceptive though risky 
maneuver which might bring him a quick victory. At the same time, 
if the attempted maneuver should fail, then Mr G would be left in 
an exposed position and defeat would almost certainly follow. 
Imagine that you are advising Mr. G. Listed below·are several 
probabilities or odds that Mr. G's deceptive play would succeed. 
PLEASE CHECK THE LOWEST PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD CONSIDER 
ACCEPrABLE FOR THE RISKY PIAY IN QUESTION TO BE ATTEMPrED. 
The chances are 1 in 10 that the play would succeed. 
-----
The chances are 2 in 10 that the play would succeed. 
-----
The chances are 3 in 10 that the play would succeed. 
--~-
--~-The chances are 4 in 10 that the play would succeed. 
_____ The chances are 5 in 10 that the play would succeed. 
The chances are 6 in 10 that the play would succeed. 
--~-
The chances are 7 in 10 that t~ play would succeed. 
-----
The chances are 8 in 10 that the play would succeed. 
-----
_____ The chances are 9 in 10 that the play would succeed. 
--~-Place a check here if you think Mr. G should !!2! attempt the 
risky play, no matter what the probabilities. 
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8. Mr. H, a college senior, has studied the piano since childhood. 
He has won amateur prizes and given small recitals, suggesting that 
Mr. H has considerable musical talent. As graduation approaches, 
Mr. H has the choice of going to medical school to become a physic-
ian, a profession which would bring certain prestige and financial 
rewards; or entering a conservatory of music for advanced training 
with a well-known pianist. Mr. H realizes that even upon completion 
of his piano studies, which would take mariy more years and a lot 
of money, success as a concert pianist would not be assured. 
Imagine that you are advising Mr. H. Listed below are several 
probabilities or odds that M:r. H would succeed as a concert 
pianist. 
PLEASE CHECK THE LOWEST PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD CONSIDER 
ACCEPTABLE FOR MR. H TO CONTINUE WITH HIS MUSICAL TRAINING. 
~~-Place a check here if you think Mr. H should B2.:!:. pursue his 
musical training, no matter what the probabilities. 
The chances are 9 in 10 that Mr. H would succeed as a concert 
pianist. 
The chances are 8 in 10 that Mr. H would succeed as a concert 
pianist. 
The chances are 7 in 10 that Mr. H would succeed as a concert 
pianist. 
The chances are 6 in 10 that Mr. H would succeed as a concert 
pianist. 
The chances are 5 in 10 that Mr. H would succeed as a concert 
pianist. 
The chances are 4 in 10 that Mr. H would succeed as a concert 
pianist. 
The chances are 3 in 10 that Mr. H would succeed as a concert 
pianist. 
The chances are 2 in 10 that Mr. H would succeed as a concert 
pianist, 
The chances are 1 in 10 that M:r. H would succeed as a concert 
pianist. 
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9. Mr. J is an American captured by the enemy in World War II and 
placed i:n a prisoner-of-war camp. Conditions in·the camp:are quite 
bad, with· long hours of hard physical labor and a barely sufficient 
diet. After spending several months in this· camp, Mr. J notes the 
possibility of escape by concealing himself in ·.a supply truck that 
shuttles in.and out of the·camp. Of course, there is no guarantee 
that the escape would prove· successful. Recapture by the· enemy 
could well mean execution. 
Imagine that you are·advising Mr. J. Listed below are·several 
probabilities or·odds of a successful escape from the prisoner-
of=war camp. 
PLEASE CHECK THE LOWEST PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD CONSIDER 
ACCEPTABLE FOR AN ESCAPE . TO BE ATTEMPrED. 
___ The chances:are 1in10 that the escape would Sltlcceed. 
The ·chances are 2 in 10 that the·escape would succeed. 
---
The chances :are 3 in 10 t~at the·escape would succeed. 
---
The chances are 4 in 10 that the ·escape would succeed. 
---
The chances are 5 in 10 that the :escape would .succeed. 
---
The·chances are 6 in.10 that the·escape would succeed. 
---
The·chances are 7 in 10 that the :escape would succeed. 
---
The chances:are 8 in 10 that the escape would succeed. 
---
The chances are 9 in 10 that the·escape would succeed. 
---
---
Place.a check here if you think-Mr. J should~ try ~o escape 
no matter what the probabilities. 
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10. Mr. K is a successful businessman who has participated in ·.a number 
of civic activities of conside.rable value ·to the· community. Mr. 
K has been.approached by the.leaders of his political party as a 
possible congressional candidate in the·next election. Mr. Kvs 
party is a minority party. in the district, though the·party has 
won occassional elections in the past. Mr. K would· like to hold 
political office, but to do·so would involve.a serious financial 
sacrifice, since the party has insufficient campaign funds. 
He would also have to·endure the,attacks·of his political 
opponents in.a hot campaign. 
Imagine that you are advising Mr. K· Listed below are several 
probabilities ·or odds :of Mr. Kvs winning the ·election in his 
district. 
PLEASE ClIECK THE·LOWEST PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD CONSIDER 
ACCEPTABLE TO MA~ IT.WORTHWHILE FOR MR. K TO RUN FOR POLITICAL 
·OFFICE. 
Place a check here· if you thi.nk Mr. K .should not run for political 
office no matter what the ·probabilities. 
The chances :are 9 in 10 that Mr. K would win the-election. 
The ·chances :are 8 in . 10 that Mr. K would win· the :election • 
The :chances are 7 in 10 that Mr. K would win the ·election. 
The ·chances are 6 in 10 that Mr. K would win the ·election. 
The ·chances are 5 in 10 'that Mr. K would win the ·election~ 
The ·chances are 4 in 10 that Mr. K would win the ·election. 
'I'he ·chances are 3 in 10 that Mr. K would win the ·election. 
The ·chances .are 2 in 10 that M:r. K would win the election. 
The ·chances are 1 in 10 that Mr. K would win the ·election. 
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11. Mr. L, a married 30-year old research physicist, has been given a 
five year appointment by a major university laboratory. As he 
contemplates the next five years, he realizes that he might work 
on a difficult long-term problem which, if_a solution·could be 
found, would resolve basic scientific issues ·in·the field .and 
bring high scientific honors. If no solution were-found, however, 
Mr. L would have-little to show for his-five years in the -labora-
tory, and this would make it hard for him to get a good job after= 
wards. On the other hand, he could, as most of his professional 
associates.are doing, work on·a series of short-term problems 
where solutions would be-easier to find, but where the-problems 
are -of lesser scientific importance. 
Imagine that you are,advising Mr. L. Listed below are several 
probabilities or odds that a solution would be found to the 
difficult long-term problem that Mr. L has in·mind. 
PLEASE CHECK THE-LOWEST PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD CONSIDER 
ACCEPTABLE TO MAKE IT WORTHWHILE FOR MR. L TO WORK ON THE MORE 
DIFFICULT LONG~TERM PROBLEM. 
The chances are 1 in 10 that Mr. L would solve the long=term 
---problem. 
___ The· chances are 2 in 10 that Mr. L would solve the long=te.rm 
problem. 
___ The-chances are -3 in 10 that Mr. L would solve the long-term 
probleI11. 
The chances are 4 in 10 that Mr. L would solve the long-term 
---problem. 
The chances are 5 in 10 that Mr. L would solve the long~term 
---1>-roblerri .. 
___ The chances :are 6·in 10 that Mr. L would solve the long=term 
problem. 
___ 'I'he chances .are 7 in 10 that Mr. L would solve the -long=term 
problem. 
The chances are 8 in 10 that Mr. L would solve the long~term 
---problem. 
~~-The-chances .are 9 in 10 that Mr. L would.solve the long-term 
problem. 
___ Place a check here if you think Mr. L should . .!12! choose the-long-
term, difficult problem, no matter what the probabilities. 
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12. Mr. M is contemplating marriage to Miss T, a girl whom he has 
known for a little more than a year. Recently, however, a number 
of arguments have occurred between them, suggesting some sharp 
differences of opinion in the way each views certain matters. 
Indeed, they decide to seek professional advise from a marriage 
counselor as to whether it would be wise for them to marry. On 
the basis·of these meetings with a marriage counselor, they 
realize that a happy marriage, while possible, would not be assured. 
Imagine that you are advising Mr. Mand Miss T. Listed below 
are several probabilities or odds that their marriage would prove 
to be a happy and successful one. 
PLEASE CHECK THE LOWEST PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD CONSIDER 
ACCEPTABLE FOR MR. M AND MISS T TO GET l"ARRIED. 
___ Place a check here if you think Mr. M and Miss T should !!Q.!:. 
marry, no matter what the probabilities. 
The chances are 9 in 10 that the marriage would be happy and 
---successful. 
The chances are 8 in 10 that the marriage would be happy and 
---successful. 
The chances are 7 in 10 that the marriage would be happy and 
---successful. 
The chances are 6 in 10 that the marriage would be happy and 
---
successful. 
____ .The chances are 5 in 10 that the marriage would be happy and 
successful. 
The chances are 4 in 10 that the marriage would be happy and 
---successful. 
The chances are 3 in 10 that the marriage would be happy and 
---successful. 
The chances are 2 in 10 that the marriage would be happy and 
---successful. 
The chances are 1 in 10 that the marriage would be happy and 
- successful. 
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